Exclusive Fisheries Zones and
Freedom of Navigation*

WILLIAM T. BURKE**

The nearly universal extension to 200-nautical-mile resource
fishery zones by coastal States has revolutionized the law of the
sea in the past decade. In balancing coastal State fishery interests with rights of freedom of navigation, the author concludes
that only limited authority to affect navigation should be recognized. This right should be reserved to developing States that
have special dependence on fisheriesfor their economic development, but lack enforcement capabilities.
INTRODUCTION

The Problem
Widespread proliferation of coastal State resource jurisdiction
to 200 nautical miles' has different effects on the interests of
coastal and non-coastal States. 2 A major intended effect is to ben* This paper is a revised and updated version of a portion of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Fisheries Technical Paper
No. 223 "Fisheries Regulations under Extended Jurisdiction and International
Law" (1982) which was completed in 1981. Portions reproduced with permission of
the FAO. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
** Professor of Law and Marine Studies, University of Washington.
1. As of May 1, 1981, the United States Department of State reported that 90
States claim 200-nautical-mile zones, of which 54 were conomic zones, and 14
were territorial sea, leaving 32 extended fishing zones. The report notes also that
boundary situations with neighboring States prevent many States from extending
their fishing zones to a full 200 nautical miles. OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LmITs IN THE SEAS NO.

36, at 1 (4th rev. 1981).
2. Of course most States are coastal, but some have interests that arise from
ocean uses and involvement on a.global or oceanic scale and therefore have a different perception of issues concerning coastal State jurisdiction.
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efit the coastal State by securing control over access to living resources in the area. The theory is that the benefits of controlled
access can be captured and directed to the coastal State for such
redistribution as its interests direct.3 In time the 200-nautical-mile

exclusive economic zone (EEZ) concept might also enable coastal
States to realize benefits from non-fishery resources in the zone
in addition to oil and gas which are already being used.
Whether and to what extent the 200-mile zones actually do produce net benefits from fisheries exploitation to a specific State or
to coastal States as a whole are matters for inquiry. Calculating
gains and losses should include an assessment of the impact on
non-coastal States in terms of both the distribution of the wealth
realized from the 200-nautical-mile zone and of the detrimental effects on other interests.
Certainly most conventional living resources of the ocean are
now within coastal State jurisdiction and control because of the
nearly universal extension of 200-nautical-mile resource fishery
zones. For non-coastal States it is also important that these zones
continue to be used for navigation by all types of vessels moving
between points external to the zone. Some of these are fishing
vessels that also seek to catch (or process) fish outside the zone
and sometimes have already done so before entering the zone.
Coastal States seeking to exercise control over fisheries in their
zones are naturally concerned whether fishing vessels found
there either are merely in transit or are licensed and complying
with applicable fishery regulations. These States have a significant interest in assuring that transiting vessels neither engage in
illegal fishing nor violate other laws governing all fishing and
fishery related activities in the zone. Flag States of transiting vessels, fishing and otherwise, also have important interests at stake
in being assured that movement is not significantly impeded by
coastal measures to protect fisheries.4 The basic problem is how
to achieve a balance between these competing interests.
Examination of this problem is useful for two reasons. First,
the threat of illegal fishing by unauthorized vessels is particularly
important to some small developing States that are heavily dependent upon potential income from licensed fishing but have in3. For a particularly helpful discussion of the issues and difficulties involved
in this economic analysis, see Holt & Vanderbilt, Marine Fisheries,in 2 OCEAN YB.
9, 44-56 (E. Borgese & N. Ginsberg eds. 1980).
4. See generally Bilder, The Emerging Right of PhysicalEnforcement of Fisheries Measures Beyond TerritorialLimits, in FISHERIES CONFICTS IN THE NORTH
ATLImc:

PROBLEMS OF MANAGEMENT AND JURISDICTION 147, 148, 162-63

(G.

Pontecorvo ed. 1974) (for early recognition and caution about a link between treat-

ment of fishing vessels and of navigation in general).
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sufficient means to undertake the necessary surveillance and
enforcement activities in their extensive resource zones. Second,
the conflicting interests at stake, resource controls versus navigation, forces focus on a critical question about the major innovation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(Convention),5 the introduction of the EEZ. The question is how
to accommodate the exercise of coastal sovereign rights over resources in the zone with freedom of navigation under international law.
The immediate clash of interests is not wholly academic. Fears
of unauthorized fishing by passing vessels have bothered some
Pacific Island nations through whose zones vessels from Korea,
Taiwan, and Japan normally travel enroute to fishing grounds
elsewhere. 6 Areas with potential problems include West Africa as
European vessels transit enroute to South Africa, Namibia and
Ocean as vessels transit from the
Senegal, and the eastern Indian
7
south to the Bay of Bengal.
Measures are already being adopted or proposed by coastal
States to protect against illegal fishing. The focus of this article
will be on many of those proposed measures as enumerated hereinafter. Following brief consideration of the policies at stake, attention will be directed toward pertinent decisions and principles
of conventional and customary law, with special reference to provisions of the Convention. The final section takes a close look at
the proposed measures in light of those decisions and principles.
Claims of Authority Affecting Navigation
Coastal States seek improved marine law enforcement in a variety of ways, including the addition of personnel, ships, aircraft
5. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Convention].
6. Ambassador Djalal reported this concern regarding vessels transiting Indonesian waters. See Djalal, Implementing of Agreements with Foreigners,in LAw
OF THE SEA: PROBLEMS OF CONFLICT AND MANAGEMENT OF FISHERIES IN SOUTHEAST

AsIA 39, 44-45 (F. Christy ed. 1980). Evidence that this problem concerns States
may also be seen in the discussion of it in the Workshop on Harmonization and
Coordination of Fisheries Regimes and Access Agreements which was convened
by the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency in Suva, Fiji in Feb.-Mar. 1982. The
documentation and report of the Workshop are not yet available. FAO Fisheries
Technical Paper No. 223, from which this article derives, was among the documents discussed at this meeting..
7. The areas mentioned in the text are cited for illustration only. The Caribbean and the western side of South, Central, and North America might also be
cited.

and associated equipment; cooperative measures with other
coastal nations with similar problems in the region; and agreements with fishing States on measures these States must take to
fadilitate enforcement.8 One means peculiarly within coastal
State control is the fashioning of the regulatory system so that enforcement difficulties are minimized. Part of this effort is the establishment of fishery regulations that might affect movement or
operation of fishing vessels in transit in .such a way as to make
the enforcement task easier.
A number of measures have been adopted or proposed for protecting coastal interests in fisheries from passing vessels. They
reflect varying perceptions of the scope of authority a State is permitted, or should be permitted, to claim and exercise beyond national territory. Such alternatives include the following:
1. Application of territorial sea authority to fishing vessels passing through the exclusive fishing or economic zone;
2. Prohibition of entry by unlicensed fishing vessels into the
EEZ or exclusive fishery zone (EFZ) unless specifically
authorized;
3. Requiring use of prescribed sealanes by transiting fishing
vessels;
4. Requiring report of entry and exit together with route used;
5. Stowage of fishing gear during passage;
6. Requirement for carriage and use of transponders during
passage;
7. Protective measures reached by international agreement.
POLICIES AT STAKE

The principal policy problem is to balance coastal State interests in realizing benefits from its fisheries with worldwide interests in maintaining unimpeded navigation for all ships, including
those involved with fishing.
The overall problem for the coastal State is to establish a
credible fishery management system that can produce expected
benefits. Credibility and expectation of benefits are closely
linked. Credibility as used in this context means that prescribed
regulations are taken seriously by the affected group and are usually observed. In order to establish credibility there must be
some assurance that deviation from prescriptions will be penal8. For a comprehensive assessment of the objectives, needs, and methods of
enforcement of marine law, see FAO/Norway Cooperative Program, Report on an
Expert Consultation on Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Systems for Fisheries Management (1981), U.N. FAQ Doc. N. FAO/GCP/INT/34-4/NOR [hereinafter
cited as FAO-Norway Cooperative Program].
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ized. But enforcing compliance is very difficult and sometimes an
almost impossible and costly task for States with large fishing
zones but few resources to devote to enforcement functions. Absent effective enforcement, credibility declines, the management
system itself may be threatened, and potential benefits are reduced. Experience has shown that some minimum level of enforcement activity is required if foreign fishermen are to pay heed
regularly to applicable regulations. 9 If the level falls below the
minimum the result is massive disregard of regulations, whereas
even moderate enforcement capability may substantially increase
compliance. Accordingly, for fisheries management to produce
the social and economic benefits sought, the level and effectiveness of enforcement, including surveillance, capacity to apprehend, actual arrest, and penalty are all critical matters. The
alternative is potentially severe reduction of benefits such as loss
of revenue, loss of employment opportunities, and perhaps harm
to the resource.10
For some States the consequences of enforcement failure are
usually high because of two simultaneously occurring factors:
(1) the resources of the EFZ are a major part of the national resource base, and (2) the zone itself is enormous relative to land
territory. Under these circumstances revenues from fishery resources are a very significant actual or potential component of the
national income, yet the size of the exclusive zone creates exceptional difficulties in maintaining the effective management system
that is required to realize the potential revenues. A number of
Central and Western Pacific Ocean island States fall into this category." A few continental nations might also be included where
terrestrial resources are extremely sparse and living marine resources are especially rich and abundant. 12 In all such instances
the combination of abundant and valuable fishery resources, inadequate enforcement system and facilities, and relatively large ex9. See Gulland, Fishery Monitoring, Control and Surveillance: When is it
Worth While, in FAO-Norway Cooperative Program, supra note 8, at 29.
10. The type and costs of a system for monitoring, control, and surveillance
(MCS) will vary according to many elements, and each coastal State must examine its own situation carefully to determine the relative costs and benefits of
alternatives. See Gulland, supra note 9.
11. For a description and appraisal of the MCS problems in these States, see
Miles, The Management of Tuna Fisheriesin the West Central and Southwest Paczfic, in FAO-Norway Cooperative Program, supra note 8, at 103.
12. Mauritania and Senegal might be examples of this situation.

clusive resource zones suggests a special need to devise better
means to increase compliance with fishery regulations.
In contrast, the general maritime community is concerned with
maintaining efficient navigation of all ships transiting resource
zones around the globe. If efficient navigation can easily be compromised in order to protect local fisheries interests, other interests of importance to coastal States might also serve to justify
similar claims and navigation might be otherwise seriously
compromised.
The immediate problem of accommodating coastal State fishing
interests is not widely shared, while navigation interests are.
Much greater weight should in general therefore be placed upon
protecting navigation interests. Nevertheless, fishery resource interests merit protection, especially those of coastal States with
unusual economic dependence on such resources.
The key to resolving the conflicting interests is recognition of
the exceptional dependence of some small nations upon possible
revenues from exploitation, mostly foreign, of fisheries within
their jurisdiction.13 Where the fisheries are vital to national wellbeing because of this dependency, and enforcement is difficult yet
critical to effective realization of financial benefit, it is appropriate
to allow slight modification of total freedom of movement in order
to facilitate effective management. A policy giving greater weight
to coastal ocean resource interests appears justified in these exceptional situations where the impacts on navigation are slight
and the benefits to the coastal State from improved compliance
and enforcement would be unusually large and important.
Considerable emphasis is due two factors relating to this policy
preference: (1) the very small number of States for whom fishery
resources are or could be vitally important and whose enforcement capabilities are virtually non-existent;14 and (2) the recognition of very limited coastal authority to affect navigation. The
latter consideration minimizes impact on navigation and the for13. Of the developing island States (independent or self-governing) in the central and southwest Pacific only two have substantial land area and resources:
Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. The other entities include Western
Samoa, Nauru, Fiji, Tonga, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Vanuatu, Cook Islands, Niue, Palau,
Federated States of Micronesia, and Marshall Islands. Most of them are or will be

substantially dependent on ocean resources for long-term economic growth. Nauru and Kiribati have substantial phosphate deposits but these are being depleted

progressively and other sources of income will be needed. For a convenient summary of historical and current data, see Australian Foreign Affairs Record, May

1981.
14. It seems likely that only the island nations of the Pacific and Indian

Oceans and possibly a few West African States would fall in the category de-

scribed in the text.
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mer assures that even this slight effect would be felt, if at all, only
in a few parts of the globe. As circumscribed by these two factors,
coastal States should be accorded authority to adopt measures
aimed at protecting fisheries and affecting navigation.
CURRENT TRENDS IN DECISION

Before discussing decisions specifically bearing on this problem, some preliminary remarks addressing the general question
of the applicable law and the significance and meaning of the relevant provisions of the Convention are pertinent.
The most significant decisions concerning the claims of interest
are those that comprise both customary international law and
treaties; including the most recently adopted multilateral agreement, the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Customary international law has more than usual significance for a number of
reasons. First, the prior law of the sea treaties concluded at Geneva in 195815 are now superceded in important respects by developments in state practice. The near-universal adoption of 200
mile exclusive zones for fishing has largely displaced understandings embodied in the 1958 High Seas Convention or that on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas.
Second, the Convention on the Law of the Sea has been formally
adopted by the Conference but its provisions will not come into
force for some time. Meanwhile, customary principles are useful.
Third, the negative vote by the United States could mean that so
far as relations with the United States are concerned customary
law principles will be applicable when they differ from those in
the Convention. From a strictly United States perspective, customary law principles may be especially crucial because the
United States might not be able to invoke the treaty's principles
or always demonstrate that it represents customary law.
Special attention is due the Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The Convention is extremely important, of course, because it will
probably become effective for nearly all States of the world, excepting, only initially perhaps, the United States and a very few
15. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, Apr.
29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, TJ.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29,
1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.LA.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.

others. Even the non-party States may indicate their willingness
to employ the treaty in their external relations, although this conceivably could not be effective if the other States determine that
traditional customary law would be more beneficial to them as
against non-parties.
At some point in the future, therefore, it is likely that the Convention will provide the principles virtually all States will apply in
assessing the lawfulness of coastal State measures affecting navigation of fishing vessels in the economic zone. Contemporary
views about interpretations of pertinent provisions of this treaty
are accordingly of special interest, even though they were not advanced having in mind the specific problems considered here.
In terms of the Convention the question arising from all proposals to regulate fishing vessels in transit is that of accommodating
coastal State rights over fisheries with appropriate recognition of
freedom of navigation in the EEZ as provided for in the Convention. Article 56 of the Convention declares that in the EEZ, the
coastal State has "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring
and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources,
whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil."16 In exercising these

rights, the coastal State is obliged to have "due regard to the
rights and duties of other States." 17 The Convention spells out
the coastal State's authority to promulgate laws and regulations
for fishing in the EEZ in article 62, but does not expressly provide
for regulatory competence vis-a-vis fishing vessels in transit.
The Convention declares that other States have rights in the
EEZ. Article 58 states that "[in the exclusive economic zone, all
States, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in
Article 87 of navigation and overflight ....

,,18

The specific issue arising under these provisions is whether the
coastal State may prescribe and enforce upon passing vessels
measures to prevent unauthorized fishing. In terms of the Convention the question is whether regulations affecting passing fishing vessels fall within the coastal State's sovereign rights to
conserve and manage its EEZ fisheries. If such regulation is an
exercise of its sovereign rights, then the coastal State, pursuant to
article 73, may take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest, and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the coastal State's laws and regulations.
16. Convention, supra note 5, art. 56, para. 1(a).
17. Id. art. 56, para. 2.

18. Id. art. 58, para. 1.
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Further, the right to exercise freedom of navigation spelled out in
article 58 is expressly stated to be subject to the relevant provisions of the Convention, among which are those providing for the
sovereign rights of the coastal State.
Views differ regarding coastal State competence to adopt measures affecting navigation by fishing vessels in transit through the
zone. One view is that the freedom of navigation mentioned in article 58 is identical to high seas freedom of navigation in traditional law. In an article emphasizing the importance to the
United States of freedom of movement in the law of the sea context, then Ambassador Elliot Richardson of the United States
commented on the key language of article 58:
In the group which negotiated this language it was understood that the
freedoms in question, both within and beyond 200 miles, must be qualitatively and quantitatively the same as the traditional high-seas freedoms
recognized by international law: they must be qualitatively the same in
the sense that the nature and extent of the right is the same as traditional
high-seas freedoms; they must be quantitatively the same in the sense
that the included uses of the sea must embrace a range no less complete-and allow for future uses no less inclusive-than traditional highseas freedoms. 19

Although this quote does not explicitly rule out coastal State regulations that are designed and limited to protect coastal State resources from illegal fishing by passing vessels, it might
reasonably bear this interpretation. Under traditional international law, a coastal State could not extend its regulations to fishing vessels in passage beyond its territorial sea and any effort to
enforce compliance with its regulations would have been re20
garded as inconsistent with the high seas freedom of navigation.
A later passage in the Richardson article notes that "under the
text the United States would have the right to bring suit against a
21
State that interferes with navigation or overflight."
In another commentary offering detailed examination of the
problem of accommodating coastal State resource rights with
rights of third States in the EEZ, Professor Bernard Oxman also
19. Richardson, Power,Mobility, and the Law of the Sea, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 902,
916 (1980) (emphasis original).
20. See Bilder, supra note 4, at 150-52. However, Bilder also points out that
both the Convention on the Continental Shelf and the Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas implicitly qualified the principle of non-interference that is the corollary to freedom of navigation. See supra
note 15.
21. Richardson, supra note 19, at 916.

rejected any coastal State regulatory competence over passing
fishing vessels. He stated:
In a strict juridical sense, the economic zone elaborated in the RSNT
[Revised Single Negotiating Text] should be regarded as an overlay on
the high seas. It generally eliminates freedom of fishing and to a certain
degree some other freedoms (e.g., with respect to some scientific research
and installations) and establishes a measure of concurrent rights or jurisdiction with respect to others (e.g., some scientific research and some vessel-source pollution), but it does not eliminate the traditional role of the
flag state.
The clearest example of this is in the articles on vessel-source pollution.
The rights of the coastal state do not displace the rights and duties of the
flag state to control pollution from its vessels, but rather supplement
them. However, other examples are worth noting as well. The sovereign
rights of the coastal state with respect to fishing do not deprive a fishing
vessel of freedom of navigation; nor do they deprive the flag state of its
jurisdiction over that vessel, for example in the event of a collision, or
even its right to punish the master and crew for violating coastal state
fishing laws independent of any coastal state action. The existence of separate jurisdiction over the same vessel in the same area depending on its
activities may require some nice accomodations in practice, depending on
the facts. Absent specific evidence it would be manifestly unjustifiable to
stop and board afreighteror oil tanker navigatingthrough the zone to ensure that it is not fishing, but it would also be manifestly imprudent to expect the coastalstate to refrainfrom inquiry regardinga largefishingfleet
moving slowly with gear in readinessand with no apparent destination
through a richfishing groundfarfrom any known navigation route.2 2

The suggestion is that all the coastal State could do to protect
itself is to make inquiry by stopping and boarding the vessels involved in the "large fishing fleet." Other measures would be prohibited even if reasonable in regard to coastal and flag interests.
A very different view of the balance in the Convention is that
the rights of freedom of navigation and overflight are subject to
the relevant provisions of the Convention and that, therefore,

these rights are subordinate to the coastal competences in the
EEZ. In this interpretation of the Convention the very use of the

term "sovereign rights" "implies that, in case of doubt, there win
be a presumption in favour of the plenary powers and jurisdiction
of the coastal State."2 3 Further,
22. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
1976 New York Sessions, 71 Aw. J. INT'L L. 247, 263-64 (1977) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). For many years Professor Oxman has been one of the principal
negotiators at the Conference for the United States and he continued to be until
1982.
In a recent article, I expressed agreement with Oxman's statement that the Convention establishes the "qualitative identity" of economic zone and high-seas freedoms. Burke, National Legislation on Ocean Authority Zones and the
ContemporaryLaw of the Sea, 9 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.289, 303 (1981). This identity can be accepted without entirely rejecting coastal authority to protect fisheries
by measures which affect navigation.
23. Brown, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Criteriaand Machineryfor the Resolution of InternationalConflicts Between Different Users of the EEZ, 4 MAPL PoL.
MGMT. 325, 334 (1977).
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[i]t must be said that the balance of principles is weighed heavily in favour of the coastal states. It is a question of sovereign rights exercised
with due regard to the rights of other States on the one hand; and, on the
other hand, of freedoms of navigation, overflight, etc., being enjoyed "subject to the relevant provisions of the present Convention,"... having due
and in compliance with the laws
regard to the rights of the coastal State
and regulations of the coastal State.24

This approach to interpretation places greatest weight on coastal
interests and would resolve disputes in favor of the coastal State.
These two contrasting interpretations of the Convention do not
exhaust the possibilities, but they do suggest that very different
views exist on the issue presented. Another more specific view is
that freedom of navigation does not wholly insulate fishing vessels in transit from compliance with coastal measures designed to
enforce prohibition of illegal fishing, provided that such measures
are essential to effective enforcement, do not significantly affect
passage, and benefit the coastal State to a significant degree.
Modest requirements that might occasion slightly longer voyages,
or require specific measures aboard a fishing vessel, are consistent with the Convention.
Even if a great many coastal States adhere to the treaty, so that
they use treaty standards to resolve conflicting claims regarding
jurisdiction relating to fisheries, States not accepting the treaty
may face considerable uncertainty regarding the views of the
States parties. Rejection of the treaty may entail rejection of
those provisions on freedom of navigation in the zone but would
not also mean rejection of a resource or fisheries zone. In one
form or another, extended exclusive coastal control over fisheries
is already recognized customary law, but this recognition does not
include an established arrangement for balancing sovereign rights
over resources with rights of navigation. Most claimant States incorporate one or another formula, some drawn verbatim from earlier negotiating texts, for protection of navigation in the zone and
preservation of coastal rights. But some legislation is so qualified
that if unchanged it would countenance considerable interference
with navigation. 25 Other States make no mention at all of freedom of navigation in their zone legislation. While it is fair to say
that the majority of States evidence recognition of the problem
and make some provision for it, it is also fair to say that State
practice is still unclear and this might create difficulties if it is
24. Id.

25. For a discussion of this legislation, see Burke, supra note 22.

necessary to resort to customary law. The treaty has the advantage of a common formula for interpretation and application in
practice and it narrows the range of differences that might arise.
It is conceivable that non-parties to the Convention will seek to
argue that the EEZ remains high seas so far as they are concernd and that traditional freedom of navigation is applicable.
Such a view appears to assume that nearly universal State practice in extension of sovereign rights over fisheries and perhaps all
other economic resources within 200 miles can be accommodated
without disturbing other ocean uses, especially navigation. The
problem with this view is that already noted immediately above.
Most States with zone legislation recognize that there is a problem of accommodation and have adopted general formulas, most
of which subjects navigation rights to resource rights. If customary law exists outside the Convention, this is the form it takes.
More detailed comment on customary law in this matter is offered
below in connection with discussion of possible measures for coping with illegal fishing.
POTENTIAL MEASURES

Turning from these general observations, we now consider
some of the specific potential measures affecting navigation in
light of current trends in decision.
Application of TerritorialSea Authority to Fishing Vessels
Passing Through the Exclusive Fishingor Economic Zone26
Insofar as actual fishing by such vessels is concerned, this alternative is already uniformly recognized; that is, coastal States may
act to prohibit unauthorized foreign fishing in the fisheries zone
in a fashion not significantly different than in the territorial sea.
This approach adds, however, some new elements:
1. Fishing vessels in passage must comply with the same laws as
are imposed on fishing vessels in passage through the territorial sea, including application of the concept of innocent passage in the exclusive zone. 27 Failure to comply with such laws
26. This situation already pertains for the fourteen States that now claim a

200-mile territorial sea.
27. Although the Maldives requires consent for entry of fishing vessels into its
EEZ, its law applies innocent passage standards to movement through the EEZ.

See Law No. 32/76 of 5th December, 1976, Relating to the Navigation and Passage

by Foreign Ships and Aircrafts through the Airspace, Territorial Waters and the
Economic Zone of the Republic of Maldives, in 9 NEw DmEcnoiis INTHE LAW OF

295-96 (M. Nordquist &K. Simmonds eds. 1980). The consent requirement
is inconsistent with the concept of innocent passage. (Unless otherwise noted, all
laws cited are also to be found in the United Nations Legislative Series.)
THE SEA
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would entail loss of innocent passage protection, thus entitling
the coastal State to prevent passage. The coastal State might,
on the other hand, seek to impose the more severe sanctions
of arrest, fine, and confiscation of boat, gear, or catch. Perhaps
the most significant single coastal law in this connection is
that requiring gear to be stowed so that it is not readily
28
available;
2. Passage of unlicensed fishing vessels might be suspended on
the ground that widespread infringements of coastal fishing
laws are a threat to the security of that State.2 9 Justification
for this action would be cast in terms of the impact upon the
coastal State's economic health and fiscal standing resulting
from large-scale illegal fishing in the zone;
3. Movement through the zone must be continuous and expeditious, meaning that no stopping is permitted except as incidental to ordinary navigation or required by force majeure or
distress or for rendering assistance. Such a requirement implies that the navigation route be direct and detours avoided
subject to the conditions just noted,
4. Another possibility might be a coastal demand that fishing
vessels in the EEZ or the EFZ comply with all territorial sea
laws and regulations extended to the zone whether aimed at
fishing vessels or not. These might include regulations for
navigation and traffic safety, pollution, security (including
new closed areas, prohibition on radio traffic, special reporting
procedures), and customs procedures (including reporting on
movements).
Only a low probability of general acceptance awaits proposals
that fishing vessels in transit through a fishery zone be treated as
if they were in a territorial sea and the same laws made applicable to passage as in the latter zone. Neither customary law nor
the treaty offer support for such an approach.
A major reason for this conclusion is that such an approach
would significantly blur the distinction between the territorial sea
28. The reference in the text is to significance among all coastal State laws.
Later discussion considers the alternative of extending only the stowage law to
the economic or fisheries zone and concludes that this would be permissible under
international law. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
29. Both the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and
the Convention on the Law of the Sea permit temporary suspension of passage
under certain conditions. It is very doubtful that the action identified in the text
would be compatible with provisions in either document

and the limited jurisdictional area beyond. The suggestion that,
for navigational purposes, the two areas are similar, or should become so, would raise serious questions relating to military and
other commercial navigation in the extended zone of jurisdiction.
For a significantly large class of vessels, and potentially all vessels, this alternative would substitute the territorial sea regime,
including the continued uncertainties and disputes about innocent passage, for the freedom of navigation that has historically
prevailed in the ocean beyond national territory. Even though initially limited to fishing vessels, the change of regime to that extent would make the zone of extended jurisdiction more closely
resemble a 200-mile territorial sea. The extension of national jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles has already advanced certain sovereign rights usually associated with national territory to a very
large region beyond. Adding an element that might significantly
affect the navigation of an important class of vessels would almost
certainly cause great uneasiness among many flag States and ultimately be rejected by them.
An additional concern would immediately arise about the precedential effect of accepting a territorial sea regime for one class of
vessels in the economic zone. Acceptance of such an extension of
jurisdiction for this interest would inevitably be seen as inviting
similar treatment for some or all other vessels. Apprehension
over such a possibility would doom any initial proposal for special
treatment of fishing vessels.
Sensitivity toward this issue certainly is heightened by the
now-concluded negotiations in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea which were in important part originally stimulated by the fear of major maritime States over socalled "creeping jurisdiction," a shorthand label for continued
unilateral extensions of territorial sea limits. The new treaty
firmly establishes a 12-mile territorial sea and an EEZ out to a
200-mile overall limit. A critical element of these agreed provisions concerns the regime for navigation in affected areas including the territorial sea itself, straits of all kinds, archipelagic
waters, and the EEZ. A major distinction was drawn between the
regime of innocent passage in the territorial sea and that of
transit passage in straits, archipelagic sealanes passage in
archipelagic waters, and freedom of navigation and overflight in
the EEZ. The distinctions among these various regimes for navigation were central to the acceptance of the jurisdictional limits
established for the various areas and for the overall Convention
itself.30
30. The Soviet Union and the United States, articulating the maritime view,
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If there were now to be noticeable movement, in the form of
unilaterally adopted State legislation (whether or not in purported implementation of the Convention), toward eliminating
some of the distinctions arrived at through laborious and controversial negotiations, the results could be unfortunate for the international community. An expected result would be the generation
of controversy and conflict surrounding the immediate legislative
action as maritime States would insist that freedom of navigation
cannot be totally abolished for fishing vessels.3 1 Over the longer
and perhaps more important term another result might be to
raise questions about the usefulness of adherence to the treaty itself. Although isolated actions proposing to eliminate freedom of
navigation for fishing vessels in the economic zone probably
would not have severe consequences or occasion undue alarm,
they still might constitute one element in a complex calculus of
factors affecting decisions about ratification of the treaty. If, instead of isolated actions, there appeared to be strong regional
movements toward altering an element of the agreed balance between coastal State resource interests and flag State navigation
interests incorporated in the Convention, much more serious consequences might be expected to follow.
The probability that the problem of transiting fishing vessels is
localized (even though the regions involved are vast expanses of
ocean) makes it unlikely that there would be a general worldwide
movement of this kind. Nonetheless any tendency that garners
significant support in one or more ocean regions could provoke
serious opposition.
To date, no State has been known to extend all of its territorial
sea laws to fishing vessels in its extended jurisdictional zone.
Some do have a provision in their EEZ law which would authorize such action.32 As noted below, however, some specific compowere the most sensitive regarding these matters. See Oxman, supra note 22; Richardson, supra note 28; see also Clingan, The Next Twenty Years of Naval Mobility,
in NAVAL REV. PROC. 82 (1980) (for several years Professor Clingan has been the
United States representative on Committee I of the Conference and is currently
the acting United States chief negotiator).
31. There can be no realistic doubt about the sensitivity of major maritime

States on this issue. Clingan, supra note 30, at 92-93 (expressions of concern on
the issue).
32. Examples of this include the economic zone laws of India, Pakistan, Seychelles, Barbados and Guyana. Section 7(7) of the Indian law appears to be the
prototype. It reads:
The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette:

nents of the territorial sea regime are being extended to the
jurisdictional zone, including the most significant one, the prohibition of foreign fishing.
Prohibitionof Entry by Unlicensed Fishing Vessels into the EEZ
or EFZ Unless Specifically Authorized
Prohibition of entry for transit is even more extreme than the
alternative just examined because it exceeds even the authority
recognized over foreign fishing vessels in the territorial sea. Only
two States appear to have laws that go this far. The Yemen Arab
Republic's measure is ambiguous and, in any case, its prohibition
excepts such entry "as may be permissible under international
Law or Convention or treaty."33 The Maldives, however, is quite
explicit in forbidding any entry by fishing vessels even for
passage.34
Excluding these two nations, a requirement for authorization of
passage of fishing vessels is universally considered to exceed
coastal State authority. Neither customary international law, the
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea nor the 1982 Convention
provides any basis for such a claim.3 5 That coastal States lack authority to prohibit innocent passage of a category of foreign ves(a) extend, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any
enactment for the time being in force in India or any part thereof, to the
exclusive economic zone or any part thereof, and (b) make such provisions as it may consider necessary for facilitating the enforcement of such
enactment, and any enactment so extended shall have effect as if the exclusive economic zone or the part thereof to which it has been extended is
a part of a territory of India.
The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other
Maritime Zones Act, 1976, § 7(7) (India), in 5 NEW DMECTIONS IN LAw OF THE SEA
305, 312 (R. Churchill, M. Nordquist & S. Lay eds. 1977).
It is possible that the aim of the above law is different than its apparent broad
effect. Whatever the purpose, the terms seem broad enough to authorize extension of the corpus of territorial sea law to the EEZ.
For the Barbados Marine Boundaries and Jurisdiction Act of 1978, see Marine
Boundaries and Jurisdiction Act, 1978, Part III (Barbados), in 7 NEw DIECTMONS IN
LAw OF THE SEA 335, 344 (M. Nordquist, S. Lay &K. Simmonds eds. 1980).
33. Article 2, Fisheries Law, Yemen Arabic Republic (1976). I am indebted to
Mr. R. Khan of the FAQ for information about this law. At this writing this law
does not appear in the U.N. Legislative Series.
34. Law No. 32/76 of 5 December 1976, supra note 27, provides that innocent
passage applies to the economic zone but at the same time, inconsistently prohibits entry by any fishing vessel unless consent to do so is secured. Apparently enforcement of the prohibition is mostly unsuccessful, but vessels have been seized
when disabled or grounded. Even if the entry prohibition were rescinded the
Maldives would still be out of step with everyone else because of its innocent passage requirement.
35. The Convention provision, supra note 5, art. 25, para. 3, for suspension of
innocent passage, if essential for protection of coastal security, offers a thin basis
for prohibiting fishing vessel passage in the territorial sea because it is aimed at
protection of military security. Such a restricted authorization in a territorial sea
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sels may be seen in the continuing dissatisfaction expressed by
many States over the fact that the Convention withholds this authority in the case of military vessels. 36 The treaty appears mainly
to reflect customary international law in providing that all vessels,
without distinction, have a right of innocent passage through the
territorial sea. Such dissent as there might be from this proposition would apply only to warships and not to fishing craft.
It is evident that a proposal to institute a requirement of prior
authorization for passage of fishing vessels through economic
zone or fishing zone not only lacks legal precedent, but is inconsistent with the Convention provisions for freedom of navigation
in the EEZ. Although there are undoubtedly more severe
problems in enforcing fishery regulations in the vast expanses of
a 188-mile zone beyond a 12-mile territorial sea than in the latter
alone, the difficulties do not appear to warrant such a drastic
change in the navigation regime.37 Other available alternatives,
less threatening to the general interest in unimpeded navigation,
should be given priority consideration.
Requiring Use of PrescribedSealanes by TransitingFishing
Vessels
Mandating the use of sealanes by fishing vessels in transit of a
fishery (economic) zone would extend a portion of coastal authority previously recognized only in the territorial sea.38 While no
State presently appears to require use of a designated sealane for
fishing vessels in the EEZ or EFZ, some have provisions in their
domestic laws which would allow such a requirement. For example, India's law provides for the declaration of a designated area
in the EEZ within which necessary provisions may be made for
of twelve miles adds to the perceived importance of freedom of navigation in the
exclusive economic zone beyond.
36. This question continued to agitate a considerable number of States in the
1981 and 1982 Conference sessions and several meetings were held to consider
their views.
37. The hazards of excluding vessels from the EEZ have not gone unnoticed.
See Warbrick, The Regulation of Navigation, in 3 NEW DnEcTIoNs IN THE LAW OF
THE SEA 137 (R. Churchill, K. Simmonds & J. Welch eds. 1973). "It is a short step
from excluding fishing vessels to excluding all ships, even without any reformulation of the nature of the exclusive claim." Id. at 146.
38. The sealane concept originated as a means of promoting safety of navigation. See Comment, The Establishment of Mandatory Sealanes by UnilateralAction, 22 CATH. UJL. REV. 108 (1972) (discussion of previous experience and an
appraisal of sealanes under international law).

exploration, exploitation and protection of resources. An "explanation" following this section states:
A notification under this subsection may provide for the regulation of entry into and passage through the designated area of foreign ships by the
establishment of fairways, sealanes, traffic separation schemes or any
other mode of ensuring freedom of navigation which is not prejudicial to
the interests of India.39

Other States with such provisions include the Seychelles, Pakistan and Guyana, each of which makes this a section of the statute rather than an "explanation."40
It is also worth noting that Australian law could have the effect
of imposing a form of mandatory sealane applicable on a vesselby-vessel basis. Section 5 of the Fisheries Act of 1975 provides
that a "person shall not, in the declared fishing zone, have in his
possession or in his charge a foreign boat equipped with nets...
for taking, catching, or capturing fish."41 A boat in transit would
fall within this proscription except for a subsequent paragraph
which provides a defense if the person charged satisfies the court
that "the boat was traveling through the Australian fishing zone
from a point outside the Australian fishing zone to another point
outside the Australian fishing zone, by the shortest practicable
route ... ."42 Presumably there is one route which is shortest
between two points at any given time and it would be up to the
vessel captain apprehended on another route to persuade a court
that the latter route was the shortest practicable. This approach,
of course, burdens the fishing vessel because it is liable to be arrested and then have to prove its bona fide status as a transiting
vessel. In addition, compliance with the Act forces the vessel to
use, where practicable, a specific route through Australian waters.
Final judgment as to what is practicable is not for the officer in
39. Section 7(6) of the Act (India), supra note 32, at 312.
40. Spain's law on the economic zone is broad enough to require foreign vessels to comply with a variety of laws to protect against unlawful fishing. Article 5
provides: "In the exercise of the freedom of navigation, foreign fishing vessels
must comply with Spanish laws designed to prevent such vessels from fishing in
the economic zone, including the laws concerning the carrying of fishing tackle."
Law 15/1978 of 20 February on the Economic Zone, Article 5, § 2 (Spain), in 8 NEW
DmEC77ONS iN LAw OF THE SEA 18, 20 (M. Nordquist, S. Lay &K. Simmonds eds.
1980). It is not clear what sanction, if any, applies for non-compliance.
In addition, Pakistan's Exclusive Fishing Zone (Regulation of Fishing) Act, 1975,
provides in Section 4(1): "Every fishing craft shall be subject to any law relating
to navigation for the time being in force." Exclusive Fishery Zone (Regulation of
Fishing) Act, 1975, in 9 NEW DmREcTroNs INLAW OF THE SEA 118, 119 (M. Nordquist
&K. Simmonds eds. 1980).
41. Fisheries Act 1975, § 5 (13 AB.) (1), No. 11837/75, AusT. C. AcTs.
42. Section 15(d) (iii) of Fisheries Amendment Act of 1978, in 7 NEw DnxcTIONS IN LAw OF THE SEA 74, 79 (M. Nordquist, S. Lay &K. Simmonds eds. 1980)
(emphasis added).
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charge of the vessel but for a court with no firsthand knowledge of
the sea or of the particular incident.
Traditional law, of course, provides authority for coastal States
to prescribe regulations for protection of its living resources in
the territorial sea. The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone made provision in article 14, paragraph 5
precisely for coastal authority for this purpose:
Passage of foreign fishing vessels shall not be considered innocent if they
do not observe such laws and regulations as the coastal State may make
andpublish
in order to prevent these vessels from fishing in the territorial
43
sea.

Previous international consideration of this problem, in the 1930
Codification Conference, makes it evident that legislation for protecting fisheries was considered permissible under customary international law.44
It seems eminently reasonable that under international law the
entity with resource jurisdiction is permitted to take measures
necessary to protect those resources from illegal harvesting.
Nonetheless, under provisions of the Convention, there might be
some question about use of sealanes for this purpose even in the
territorial sea. Article 21 declares that the coastal State may
adopt laws and regulations relating to innocent passage in respect
of "the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal State."4 5 This same article also provides
that coastal State laws and regulations may relate to the safety of
navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic. 6
Although both of these provisions seem broad enough to allow
the coastal State to require the use of sealanes by fishing vessels,
a question is created by article 22 which seems to limit such authority to where it is "necessary having regard to the safety of
navigation." This combination of provisions might be interpreted
to restrict the requirement for use of sealanes to safety considerations alone and to forbid their use for conservation or economic
purposes in connection with fishing.4 7
43. See supra note 15.
44. See M. McDoUGAL & W. BuRKE,THE PUmc ORDER OF THE OcEANs 234-42
(1962).

45. Convention, supra note 5, art. 21, para. l(e).
46. Id. para. l(a).
47. Assuming any other legal requirements were met, the only feasibly permissible use of special sealanes for fishing vessels would be in situations where no
existing sealane or traffic separation scheme was in use. Under present treaty law,
ocean-going vessels are required to comply with traffic schemes and flag States are

If this restrictive interpretation were regarded as limiting
coastal authority in its territorial sea, it would be extremely difficult to argue persuasively that the coastal State should have a
br6ader authority regarding passing vessels in the fishing zone.
On the other hand, even if the coastal State were considered to
have the appropriate authority in its territorial sea, it does not
necessarily follow that the same or substantially similar authority
must be or should be permitted in the fishing zone beyond.
The question of future interest is whether the use of sealanes in
the fisheries (economic) zone is compatible with customary law
or with the Convention. With respect to customary law there is
currently little evidence that sealanes are coming into general use
for this purpose. National legislation and regulations concerning
fisheries shed little light on this subject other than a possible negative inference that might be drawn from the relative absence of
specific provisions on sealanes.4 8
The more important question regarding customary law is
whether the acceptance already accorded the extension of exclusive fishery management authority to 200 nautical miles carries
with it acceptance of coastal authority to adopt protective measures that have some effect upon navigation in the area. As just
suggested, the evolution of extended fishery jurisdiction should
be accompanied by the authority necessary to protect the living
resources subject to that jurisdiction while at the same time protecting the right to freedom of navigation from undue
interference.
Under customary law, freedom of navigation has never been regarded as absolute even though its exercise has been widely recognized as an important and vital interest of all States. The
traditional means of reconciling coastal and flag State interests
has employed the standard of reasonableness, balancing the interests at stake and judging the permissibility of restrictions in
terms of that standard. Over the centuries and up to today, limitations on freedom of navigation have been accepted as new exclusive interests have come to be recognized. A recent prime
illustration, which occasions not even a raised eyebrow today,
arose from the extension of coastal authority over the continental
shelf. It was impossible to make adequate provision for shelf exobliged to make deviation a crime under national law. These traffic problems
would be unlikely to arise in areas far removed from normal shipping routes. In
no circumstances should a sealane be allowed where it is incompatible with established sealanes.
48. See supra note 40. Only a handful of States have national regulations
bearing on this issue and they are not known to have adopted any specific
requirement.
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ploration and exploitation under coastal State control unless freedom of navigation admitted of some modification allowing some
interference. Similarly, the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Con49
servation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, and the later
modest extension of exclusive fishing rights, required acceptance
of some slight encroachment on absolute freedom of navigation.
The problem with 200-mile fishery zones is thus simply a larger
instance of the familiar difficulty of accommodating enlarged
coastal State exclusive interests with the general international
community interests. A reasonableness standard does not call for
absolute freedom for navigation nor do coastal State sovereign
rights require or justify negation of that freedom. Under proper
circumstances, coastal State protective measures affecting navigation could be considered reasonable where they are necessary for
effective management and enforcement, hold unusual benefit for
a particular coastal State or States, and impose modest or slight
burdens on navigation. Such measures would not be directly
aimed at regulating navigation as such, but designed to protect resources subject to coastal State jurisdiction. It is conceivable that
in some situations limited probably only to certain key geographic
and other circumstances (particularly an absence of other alternatives), even a sealane for fishing vessels would be a permissible
development when reasonableness is assessed in terms of the factors mentioned.
The main question concerning these factors would be whether a
sealane requirement would really make any appreciable difference in assisting enforcement. Unless it made a very substantial
contribution to upgrading enforcement capability, the balance of
interests ought still be resolved in favor of navigation.
The question under the Convention is whether a sealanes requirement is compatible with article 58 which declares that "[in
the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and
overfight .... ,5o Can the coastal State, consistent with this provision, require passing fishing vessels to use designated sealanes?
There are two points to consider. The first is that the freedom of
navigation mentioned is that found in article 87, which is inter49. See supra note 15.
50. Convention, supra note 5, art. 58, para. 1.

preted by some to mean the high seas freedom of navigation as
traditionally understood, that is, before exclusive fishing zones
were widely accepted.51 If this were all that is relevant, the question might be answered immediately-no coastal State has authority to require vessels passing on the high seas to employ any
specific route for such passage. If it were desirable to use the sealanes concept to strengthen coastal authority to protect its interests in living resources, it would be necessary to seek
international agreement to that end.
The second point, however, is that article 58 does not confer a
pure or undiluted right to freedom of navigation in the zone. The
enjoyment of this freedom is "subject to the relevant provisions of
this Convention,"52 a condition not previously established. The
relevant provisions include the coastal State's "sovereign rights
for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing" living resources. 53 This broad grant of authority is elaborated upon in article 61 and related articles to give the coastal
State essentially complete power to dispose of the fisheries in its
zone, subject to certain general standards, and to provide requirements for cooperation with adjoining States and certain other
States fishing in the region. Articles 61 and 62, in particular, provide the coastal State with ample general authority to protect the
living resources of its zone from unauthorized foreign fishing and
lists specific competences to regulate all fishing activities by foreign vessels. The question not explicitly answered by these provisions is how far the coastal State may go in affecting passing
vessels as distinct from those expected to fish in the zone.
As noted above, it does not seem unreasonable that in some circumstances a coastal State should be allowed to reduce an onerous regulatory and enforcement burden by measures that affect
passing vessels. The question is, how much of an effect is reasonable? Assuming some impact on passing vessels does not unduly
compromise the right of freedom of navigation, and experience indicates this assumption is reasonable, what are factors relevant to
determining reasonableness?
Important factors surely must include the size of the zone relative to land mass and the value of resources therein to the national economy. In some parts of the ocean the ratio of water to
land area of the State is extremely high and there are enormous
obstacles to maintaining adequate monitoring and surveillance of
51. See supra notes 19 and 22.
52. Convention, supra note 5, art. 58, para. 1.
53. Id. See generally Convention, supra note 5, arts. 55-75 (exclusive economic
zone).
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fishing activities involving valuable resources. Designating sealanes for passing fishing vessels might in some such circumstances make the difference between effective and ineffective
enforcement and this, in turn, could have a significant impact on
coastal State revenues that are especially important to that State.
Where the advantage to the coastal State is so high and can actually be realized, the small added burden on passing vessels might
not be unreasonable. On the other hand, it is also in the large
ocean areas that the freedom to select the exact route may have
special importance because of the vast distances to be overcome
and the hazards of long-distance transit. The skippers of fishing
vessels may need to change course and normal navigation routes
in order to avoid bad weather or to take advantage of new information regarding desirable fishing areas. Perhaps these conflicting considerations could be accommodated by contingent
designations of required sealanes or by an approach that would
allow for departure from a sealane under specified conditions. If
the designation can be made flexible without eliminating its usefulness, there would be a stronger argument for the reasonableness of a sealane requirement.
On the other hand, where sealanes requirements add significant
time or hazard to fishing vessels passage, the impact on freedom
of navigation would be impermissible and flag States would have
a sound basis for objection.
On balance under the treaty, the requirement of due regard by
the coastal State for freedom of navigation imposes a heavy burden that can probably be discharged only in select and somewhat
unusual circumstances. Restrictions on free navigation of any
vessel should be limited to the exceptional situation. The main
factors of importance in applying the due regard standard appear
to be the coastal State's difficulty in securing adequate enforcement and the contribution that the fishery makes to the national
economy. If the coastal State confronts unusual enforcement
problems that are costly to a State which has significant dependence on revenues from fisheries and alternative remedies are

not available, then the case for some modest interference with
navigation would be persuasive.
Requiring Report of Entry and Exit Together with Route Used54
Another alternative that might assist coastal enforcement operations is that of requiring the report of entry by a vessel intending
only to pass through, including the expected route for such passage. Because coastal States do not have this authority even in
the territorial sea this might raise serious questions for those
States who wish to maintain the zone as much as possible like the
high seas and therefore subject to less coastal authority than in
the territorial sea.
It might be a mistake, however, to consider a reporting requirement as simply another burden raising a question about creeping
jurisdiction. From another perspective this procedure offers potential benefit to the vessel which reports its entry, route, and
cargo. An initial premise is that the coastal State is authorized by
international law to stop, board, and inspect vessels in its zone as
a means of enforcing its laws and regulations concerning fishing.
Article 73, paragraph 1 of the Convention recognizes that enforcement measures are an exercise of the coastal State's sovereign
rights over living resources in the economic zone and declares
that "the coastal State may .

.

. take such measures, including

boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be
necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations
adopted by it in conformity with this Convention." 5 5 This article
reflects State practice and customary law. Accordingly, even a
passing vessel might lawfully be stopped and boarded in connection with enforcement of local fishing laws. In some situations
54. So far as can be discovered no State requires an unlicensed fishing vessel
in transit to notify the coastal State of its entry and passage. But several States'
laws are broad enough to include such a reporting requirement, including those of
India, Seychelles, Pakistan, Barbados, and Guyana mentioned supra note 13.
However, Canada's Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations in effect require
reporting of entry if Canadian officials request the report. Coastal Fisheries
Protection Regulations, 9 December, 1976, in 5 NEw DmECTIoNs iN LAW OF THE SEA
63, 70 (R. Churchill, M. Nordquist & S. Lay eds. 1977). Section 15(2) provides that a
foreign fishing vessel en route through Canadian fisheries waters is subject to the
following conditions while in Canadian waters: "(c) Where a protection officer or
Regional Director-General requests information respecting the name, flag State,
location, route or destination of the vessel, or the circumstances under which it
entered Canadian fisheries waters, the master of the vessel shall promptly convey
the information to that officer of Regional Director-General." If the vessel in
transit had originally entered in distress or to render assistance, the vessel is
required to initiate a report of the circumstances of entry and the name, flag State,
location, route and destination of the vessel Id. § 14.
55. Convention, supra note 5, art. 73, para. 1.
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this procedure might put these vessels at considerable risk and a
reporting procedure minimizes this risk.
The problem arises when a passing vessel has fish aboard. The
fish might have been caught prior to entry into the zone or they
could have been caught in the zone. If the vessel has no permit to
fish in the zone but has fish aboard, the coastal State can reasonably conclude that the vessel has violated coastal laws requiring a
permit to harvest fish in the zone. The difficulty is, of course, that
without further evidence it would be extremely difficult to prove
that the fish aboard were actually caught in the zone and not
prior to entry.
Two States deal with this situation by adopting a presumption
that the fish aboard were caught in the zone unless the contrary
is proved. The Seychelles law permits the presumption to be rebutted by a radio call procedure:
(2) A radio call made by a foreign fishing vessel before entering the exclusive economic zone indicating that the vessel is exercising its right of
free navigation through the exclusive economic zone and notifying its proposed route and the quantity of fish on board shall suffice to rebut the presumption in subsection (1).6

Under the Bahamas law the presumption is rebutted only by a
57
showing that the fish were caught outside the zone.
Requiring reports of entry and of fish aboard may thus be seen
as both assisting coastal State enforcement and removing a potential heavy burden from the fishing vessel. Considering the
problems involved for the vessel and the enforcement dilemma
otherwise presented, a reporting requirement such as that provided by the Seychelles law might be sound. The presumption
that fish aboard were caught in the zone is not irrational and it
56. Seychelles, Control of Foreign Fishing Vessels Decree, 1979, § 15(2).
57. The Fisheries Resources (Jurisdiction and Conservation) Act, 1977, § 19(2)
(Bahamas), in 7 NEW DIRECTIONS IN LAW OF THE SEA 84 98 (M. Nordquist, S. Lay &

K. Simmonds eds. 1980).
United States fishery regulation of incidental catches of prohibited species employs a rebuttable presumption. Section 611.13 of title 50 of the Code of Federal
Regulations states: "It shall be a rebuttable presumption that any prohibited spe-

cies or part thereof found on board a foreign fishing vessel was caught and retained in violation of this Part 611." 50 C.F.R. § 611.13(c) (1982). This section
would presumably apply to fish caught outside the fishery zone and carried as
cargo on a transiting vessel Section 611.60(c) (2) provides for rebuttal if a vessel
stores prohibited species caught outside the fishery conservation zone (FCZ) in a
hold area which was inspected and sealed before the vessel commenced fishing in
the FCZ. Section 611.60 is applicable only to vessels fishing subject to a Governing
International Fishery Agreement (GIFA). 50 C.F.R. § 611.60(c) (2) (1982).

seems reasonable that reporting entry and the fish aboard will
suffice to rebut it. If a vessel has no fish aboard and intends
merely to pass, it need make no report.
Reporting entry and expected route of passage also does not
seem unreasonable. Provision of information on the location of
the vessel should assist materially in enforcement efforts by easing the burden of surveillance and inspection. The effect on navigation of reporting entry is negligible if any, while the benefit to
the coastal State could be substantial. It is possible that since a
reporting requirement sufficiently assists enforcement that more
drastic measures, such as a sealane for fishing vessels, could not
be justified.
Stowage of Fishing Gear DuringPassage58
Stowage requirements are a common provision in national legislation dealing with the territorial sea and also with the fishing
zone. The widespread adoption of this measure and its obvious
direct relationship to the protection desired make it a preferred
approach. It would seem to be a minimal obligation, in principle,
for a vessel intending only to pass. For these reasons the imposition of a gear stowage requirement as a condition of unimpeded
passage is generally well within customary law applicable to fishing zones.
Nonetheless a stowage requirement presents the practical difficulties of being too onerous a burden for some fishing gear while
for other gear it offers no protection against illegal fishing. For example, tuna seine nets are so bulky and heavy as to prevent stowage below deck and it is difficult to otherwise put such gear under
constraint. Accordingly an absolute stowage requirement in such
circumstances would be tantamount to forbidding passage completely and this is probably too severe to be regarded as permissible under international law. What appears to be needed is a
practical technical solution that places the gear beyond easy
availability.
On the other hand for pole and line fishing a stowage requirement is totally inadequate as such gear can be brought into play
quite easily even if it is stored below deck.59 By and large the
58. States with gear stowage requirements in the economic or fisheries zone
include Australia (a defense to a charge of possessing or having in charge a
foreign boat equipped to catch fish), New Zealand, Seychelles, Sierra Leone
(territorial sea of 200 nautical miles), Solomon Islands, Spain, Canada, The
Gambia, Maldives, and United Kingdom.
59. It has been recommended for halibut long-line gear in the Gulf of Alaska

where it was possible to place the gear under seal before it moved through areas
closed for halibut fishing. Koers, The Enforcement of Fisheries Agreements on the
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stowage requirement originated as a means of coping with trawling gear and it requires ingenuity and flexibility to make it an effective measure for other gear. Assuming that the necessary
technical solutions can be discovered so that gear is made practically unavailable without imposing an impossible burden such
that passage itself is not feasible, this requirement seems easily
within international law, either customary or conventional.
The Convention does not provide specifically for management
jurisdiction that might require certain behavior aboard passing
vessels but it does establish management authority broad enough
to include such regulations. lalegal fishing by passing vessels
might impact on the coastal State's responsibility for ensuring
that the resource is not endangered by over-exploitation, that the
resource produces yields which serve the economic needs of
coastal communities and the special requirements of development, and that fishing within its zone combines with fishing
outside so that the total resource and its overall exploitation are
at appropriate levels. Article 61 specifically authorizes measures
by the coastal State which serve these ends, and measures to prevent illegal fishing by passing vessels would fall under such authorization. Finally, coastal State measures may also seek to
safeguard species associated with or dependent upon harvested
species and so illegal fishing may also raise concerns for this
reason.
Requirementfor Carriageand Use of Transponders
6
During Passage
O
This suggestion suffers from both practical and legal difficulties.
From the practical point of view, it would be difficult to enforce a
demand that even casual transiting vessels carry a transponder.
In addition, a transponder can simply be left inoperative so that
no response can be forthcoming to an electronic query.
The legal difficulty, more relevant to this discussion, arises because a requirement for carrying certain equipment aboard a vessel as a condition of transiting a fishing or economic zone has a
fragile legal basis and could provoke a considerable outcry of proHigh Seas: A ComparativeAnalysis of InternationalState Practice,6
SEA INST. OCCASIONAL PAPER 24-25 (1970).

LAW OF THE

60. Vessels authorized to fish in a zone are often required to carry
transponders, but so far as is known this has not been extended to passing
vessels.

test. During the Conference negotiations, flag States were very
sensitive to suggestions that coastal States could require installation and carriage of equipment relating to vessel-source pollution
in the territorial sea. They succeeded in eliminating any such
coastal State authority except as the coastal laws are "giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards." 6 1
The same approach was used to eliminate any independent
coastal State authority in the EEZ. Article 211, paragraph 5 limits
coastal State measures for prevention, reduction and control of
pollution from vessels to those "conforming to and giving effect to
generally accepted international rules and standards established
through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference." 62 This language eliminates any independent
coastal authority to regulate pollution control equipment aboard
passing vessels.
Strong sentiment toward protection of navigation interests is
reflected throughout Part XII of the Convention and this feeling
reveals an attitude that might surface quickly if coastal States
sought to exercise authority to prescribe requirements for equipment aboard passing fishing vessels.
A specific difference should be noted between the requirement
for adding certain equipment to a vessel and a regulation affecting
equipment normally carried. A directive to stow gear so it is not
available for fishing is not the same as mandating the carriage of
specific devices that must be operated in accordance with coastal
instructions. The former may occasionally be impractical, as
noted above, so that it might be considered unreasonable solely
for that reason, but the latter rests squarely on a more openended claim to authority and it is this feature which causes the
difficulty.
Protective Measures Reached by InternationalAgreement
Often, the most effective and least costly means of dealing with
fishing vessels in transit through a zone is to spell out acceptable
and effective control measures in agreements with distant-water
fishing nations. This approach might be particularly attractive to
nations whose enforcement costs (monitoring, control and surveillance) are very high because of their small land mass in relation to the ocean region involved. In such circumstances the
coastal State (or better, the coastal States of the region) may gain
a great deal by avoiding the high costs of enforcement activities
61. Convention, supra note 5, art. 211, para. 5.

62. Id.
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while the flag State assumes some of the costs of enforcing
coastal State control measures. To achieve this by agreement
would probably entail some form of recompense to the flag State,
either by a reduction in fishing fees or some other expected benefit. However, the pay-off required by the flag State may well be
small relative to the very high costs of enforcement otherwise
borne by the coastal State.
The advantages of the agreement approach include, of course,
the removal of legal objections or obstacles to measures that
might otherwise cause concern.
CONCLUSION

The extension of coastal State sovereign rights to resources out
to 200 nautical miles has virtually revolutionized the law of the
sea in the past decade. The effects of this development on movement of vessels occasioned the noticeable concern of maritime
States during the Conference negotiations and disquiet continues
to be expressed from time to time about the accommodation
reached in Convention articles 55, 56, 58, and 87. The preceding
discussion argues that in reconciling coastal fishery interests with
navigation, only a very limited authority to affect navigation
should be recognized and then only in exceptional situations.
Such situations should probably be limited to instances of very
large resource zones outside developing States with a special dependence on fisheries for economic development but without enforcement capability.
A major reason for being cautious about general conclusions
concerning impediments to navigation is that coastal State jurisdiction extends not only to resources but to other activities, including scientific research and environmental protection. States
need to move carefully lest restraints become generalized and restrictions on vessel movement become both common and
excessive.

